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After Serrano : sacrifice and
Church politics
A reply by Damien
Casey
Casey, Fisher and Ramsay claim to
speak in the name of "Christianity and the values of ordinary people." In
order to claim to speak for Christianity, they must clearly demarcate who
does and who does not have the right to call themselves Christian. Any
ambiguity must be excluded. So called "liberals" must be cast out to the
extent that they would compromise the integrity of the group. This
attitude is much more akin to performing sacrifice than understanding it.
But then, my respondents could make neither head nor tail of what I
described as the logic of sacrifice. The logic of sacrifice as I
understand it is founded in the binary logic of the "A" verses "not A"
distinction. What is clear from the extensive anthropological and
sociological literature on sacrifice is that it is sacrifice that forms
identity and community through integration and separation. Both communion
and expiation safeguard the unity of the community through a process of
differentiation. Whether a particular sacrifice is concerned with
communion or expiation, its underlying logic is grounded in opposition.
The underlying unity of these two modes of sacrifice is perhaps best
expressed by the English word "atonement" which "is also always
at-one-ment," to make at one. Although Hubert and Mauss had recognised the
irreducibility of these two modes they were unable to establish their
unity. Nancy Jay suggests that this was due primarily to their commitment
to the idea, beloved of French sociology, that the unity of sacrifice lay
in its function as a means of "establishing a means of communicating
between the sacred and profane worlds." Although Durkheim would not accept
this distinction, sacrifice is only about the sacred in as far as the
sacred guarantees the identity of the community.
My respondents
speak, rather, in the name of those who would wish to purify the temple.
They speak of blasphemy. However, there is more than one way in which to
take God's name in vain. It is also a jealousy for what is God's that
leads me to question too sure an identification as to what constitutes
God's dignity. All we can say for certain is that God is glorified where
humanity flourishes. This the respondents themselves acknowledge. They
consider that the blasphemer in attacking religion is also attacking a
human good. But one should not forget that the same argument was also used
against the early Church when it stood outside the boundaries of the
sacrificial economy of the Roman Empire. There is currently, a struggle
going on within the Catholic Church between conservative and liberal
visions of that same Church. Both visions can claim a certain legitimacy,
but not when one or the other wants to claim the whole, to the point of
silencing other legitimate voices. There has to be a place within the
Church, as within society, for others to push the boundaries and to
question what has been taken for granted.
The respondents are
correct in noting a certain amount of hyperbole in my article. Perhaps, I
have been overzealous. The exigencies of the situation, however, seem to
suggest that a certain rhetorical licence is required in order to
establish the right for ones voice and place within the conversation. What
I find offensive is the ease in which certain reactionary Christians claim
to speak for Christianity as a whole. But then, this peculiar sensitivity
of mine springs from my equally "peculiar ecclesiology" of a "pluralist
Church." The notion of a pluralist Church is, I believe, at least
consistent with the ecclesiology of the Second Vatican Council. The
Pastoral Constitution of on the Church in the Modern World in
particular expresses a very positive attitude towards the pluralism of
society and the need for the Church to engage with and incarnate that
pluralism. But then, Archbishop George Pell considers that the Second
Vatican Council was an experiment that failed.
The bottom line in
my defence of Serrano's theological significance is my concern that a
verdict was reached before seriously considering the question as to
whether Serrano's work has anything theologically worthwhile to say.
Casey, Fisher and Ramsay claim that "the community has spoken its
preference in overwhelming numbers." But I am also aware of many
conservatively inclined Catholics who have found that Serrano's work does
raise worthwhile questions, even if ultimately, it is not to their taste.
There is much more at stake here than the value of a particular piece of
art or even of the integrity of artistic expression. I have jumped on the
Serrano bandwagon because both Piss Christ and the reaction of
those who consider the work to be blasphemous are pointing to something
critical about Christian identity and the role of sacrifice in
constituting that identity. My argument has been that Piss Christ
invokes something of the anti-sacrificial trajectory within the Christian
tradition, a trajectory to which the anti-Serrano camp would deny any
legitimacy, seeking instead to excise it in their efforts to maintain
clear and defined boundaries as to who is in and who is out. The
anti-sacrificial tradition has a correspondingly more inclusive
understanding of the nature of the Church.
Historically, all major
developments in sacrificial practice and theology have involved
corresponding development of Church social organisation. Since the Second
Vatican Council the Eucharist, which is the sacrament of the Church's
identity, has been seen less as a sacrifice and more as a sacred meal.
According to Emminghaus, "the Mass is a rite derived from a meal, not from
a sacrifice . . . . The Lord left his Church the Eucharist, that is, the
prayer of thanksgiving over bread and wine as elements of a meal. It was
precisely this that he bade her do in memory of him. He did not tell her
to carry out a sacrificial rite." (Emminghaus, 1978: xx) This has lead to
a leveling out and a democratisation of the Church that many
"traditionalists" lament. (Although both positions have an equally valid
claim to tradition.) That Piss Christ came onto the scene when the
conservative backlash began to gain momentum seems timely to the extent
that it can be seen to represent all that "traditionalists" find
objectionable about the liberal excesses that had pervaded the
Church.
I need finally to respond to the argument put forward
by Casey, Fisher and Ramsay that my claims regarding the sacrificial
interpretation of Christ's death in the New Testament is one of the few
"falsifiable propositions in my article. Their refutation is based upon
the simple equation of sacrificial interpretation with sacrificial
language that if accepted would render my argument absurd. One cannot
assume that all language referring to sacrifice was sacrificial in intent.
It is, for example, the thesis of David Power, Professor of Systematic
Theology at the Catholic University of America, that in calling Christ's
death a sacrifice a certain violence is done to sacrificial language.
(Power, 1979: 389) We should recall that in the world of the early Church
sacrifice was one of the principle means of communing with the divine.
Christians were often suspected of "atheism" precisely because they did
not sacrifice as the pagans understood it. For Christians in this
environment to claim that they too have a sacrifice, but one that exceeds
and replaces all others was, perhaps, the most straightforward way in
which to express the radicalness of the Christian break with
sacrifice.
This is not the place to get entangled in exegetical
debates about the meaning of sacrificial language within the New
Testament. Neither do I believe it to be either desirable or possible to
"purify" the New Testament of sacrifice. What I am claiming is that there
is enough evidence to warrant that the principle trajectory of New
Testament thought was in fact anti-sacrificial. To take what would seem to
be the most unambiguous reference to the sacrificial death of Christ as
given by Paul: "Christ, our paschal lamb has been sacrificed." (1 Cor
5:7), it can be seen that sacrificial metaphors are not necessarily
sacrificial in their logic. The association between Christ and the
Passover lamb was probably both early and natural to the extent that
Israel considered the Passover to be the archetype of the eschatological
event and the promise of salvation "Both Josephus and the gospels show
that the Passover was a time of intense messianic-eschatological
expectation." (Daly, 1978: 40) The context of the passage is interesting
in that it is a liturgical metaphor used in the aid of an ethical
argument. The passage continues, "let us celebrate the feast, then, by
getting rid of the old yeast of evil and wickedness, having only the
unleavened bread of sincerity and truth." The Eucharistic context of the
metaphor of the paschal lamb need not suggest a cultic understanding of
sacrifice. Rather, a strong argument can be made that the sacrificial
interpretation of Christ's death is perhaps best understood in the light
of the eschatological blessings that Christ's death and resurrection
inaugurated. Christ achieves what sacrifice cannot. Expiation is not
brought about by offerings but by through the witness given by Jesus in
his suffering and death to the kingdom of God and the witness that God
gives to his servant by his glorification. Jesus' death only has meaning
in the logic of his life of giving. His dying-for is the ultimate
expression of his living-for others. And so in the memorial of Christ's
life, death and resurrection "in the `sacrifice' of the supper, it is God
who gives to [men and women], not [men and women] to God." (Power, 1995:
118) This in fact turns sacrifice on its head.
Recent scholarship
has tended to link the Eucharist with the Jewish idea of todah
understood as a sacrifice or praise which establishes a continuity between
the Eucharist and the ideal life of the Christian. Typical of this
approach to sacrifice is Romans 12:1-2, where Paul argues that this kind
of sacrifice is given by Christ's disciples in a life lived according to
the gospel by which they offer their bodies as true worship. That it is
Christians themselves who constitute the "new temple" overturns the cultic
traffic with transcendence by making the divine an immanent reality not
separated from the profane but transforming the profane into a "new
creation." In Christ, all things are reconciled as opposed to the logic of
sacrifice which constitutes the identity of a group by opposition and
separation. That the sense of sacrifice in the New Testament and early
Church is primarily non cultic is attested to the fact, as David Power
observes, that the entire community of the baptised "were called priestly
long before their officially designated ministers." (Power, 1979: 392) The
community leaders only began to be called priests with the increasing
institutionalisation and the consolidation of the hierarchy of the Church
as it completed the move from the private to the public sphere in the
Fourth Century. As Daly notes, this process of institutionalisation was at
odds with the anti-sacrificial trajectory. (Daly, 1978: 139)
Pell's
attempt to invoke the aid of the law in his crusade to reconfigure the
boundaries of Christian identity make a lot of sense in the light of the
historical fact that it was the original rapprochement between Church and
State that saw the establishment of sacrifice at the heart of Christian
identity. One cannot in the final analysis deny that the logic of
sacrifice occupies a rather central position within the Christian
tradition. However, I refuse to recognise its legitimacy as the sole
Christian position. Whether the two can ever be reconciled is another
question. Perhaps it is the wrong question. Perhaps, Christianity is
better understood as a conversation rather than a single consistent and
complete body of doctrine. It is, however, a conversation in which
Serrano's Piss Christ deserves at least a
hearing.
REFERENCES
Daly, Robert J.
(1978) The Origins of the Christian Doctrine of Sacrifice. London,
Darton, Longman and Todd. Emminghaus, Johannes, H. (1992) The
Eucharist. Essence, Form, Celebration. Collegeville, Minnesota, The
Liturgical Press. Power, David N. (1979) "Words that Crack: The Uses of
`Sacrifice' in Eucharistic Discourse." Worship, 53. ----------
(1995) The Eucharistic Mystery. Revitalising the Tradition. New
York, Crossroad.
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