Matthew del Nevo: On Morals and Universals

The questions of universals is an old one. It was the key question in philosophy of the Middle Ages, however, their questions were mainly logical. They had no doubts on the moral score. For modern people like ourselves logical questions about universals have become difficult and the medieval ones look very difficult; not only that but we have lost the sense of the universal moral belief that the medieval period derived from its Christian understanding.

It is often charged that moral judgements are relative. The Ten Commandments are three too many if we don't believe in God. The Five Precepts (of Buddhism) don't suit me if I'm Irish because I'm not about to give up Guinness or if I'm Italian because I'm not about to give up wine. If I think something is wrong, not just a cultural practise - drinking alcohol is wrong - the charge against me is that I am overstepping the mark of good judgement. I am saying of something which is a cultural practise (in Ireland or Italy ) that it is not (ie. that it is wrong). If I say Jewish circumcision is wrong, I am asserting that it is not primarily a cultural practise, but a moral act. If circumcision is a moral act, then I could be right; but if circumcision is a cultural practise, then my moral judgement hardly applies. However, if we change the example to Islamic female circumcision many people with progressive views regard this as a moral issue rather than a cultural one; or, at least, primarily a moral issue.

I will come back to this point that precludes moral judgement on the basis that everything, morality included (perhaps morality above all) is culturally relative.

Another view I have often heard is that there are no such things as universals. The corollary (or presupposition) may be that this is because 'everything is culturally relative'. Or perhaps there may be other grounds for the proposition that there are no universals. In reply to this charge, one can, of course, point to the self-contradictory style of this proposition: there are no universals, except this universal pronouncement that there are none. Even so, the self-contradiction does not seem to waylay the charge, perhaps because the self-contradiction is too ironic and this undermines its seriousness.

These views - that things are culturally relative and that there are no universals - have a strong resonance with us culturally, and we might therefore have difficulty distinguishing the philosophical reason in them from the dogmatic postulation.

It may be that the person who says: 'there are no universals', means to say, 'there are no absolutes'. But these are two distinct things. A universal is not necessarily absolute - depending what we mean by absolute (which, we should recognise - is a negation). Moreover, when the idea of an absolute is used within a relative context its meaning would not be absolute.

I'll come back to this too.

What is a universal? Aristotle said: "some things are universal, others individual. Now by 'universal' I mean that which is of such a nature to be predicated of many, whereas 'individual' is not something of this kind." A universal is the common nature of something. White things have white in common. Whiteness is the universal.

If we look at our language we see that some words refer to particulars - principally names, like a book title or name of a college, or a country - and others stand for universals - verbs, substantives, adjectives may denote universals. If I say, "I like this", 'I' is particular to me, but 'like' is universal because many different people like many different things, but all having liking in common. If I say "that man is running" 'man' is universal because it is common to every man not just that man, and running is a universal because it is common to many. Pronouns are ambiguous. They seem to stand for either the particular or universal. 'Now' may be the present moment, but the present moment is already past, hence ambiguous.

Bertrand Russell said, "all truths involve universals, and all knowledge of truths involves acquaintance with universals." (Problems of Philosophy, p.53) No sentence can be formed without using at least one word which denotes a universal.

The thing is - and Russell points this out - we do not think twice about the universals in our utterances; in fact we interpret them in terms of particularity, thereby overlooking the universality. "When, for example we hear the sentence 'Charles I's head was cut off', we may naturally enough think of Charles I's head and the cutting off of his head, which are all particulars; but we do not naturally dwell upon what is meant by the word 'head' or the word 'cut', which is a universal." (ibid. p.54)

This returns us to the objection about something being culturally relative. The objection "that's culturally relative" is a proposition such as "I like this" and like every proposition it must presuppose universality because this universality is a given of language. But the reason that the proposition "that's culturally relative" does not sound correct as a conclusive judgement in a philosophical discussion is because 'culturally relative' is not a universal, it is a compound of ideas, a theoretical construct. But the proposition "that's culturally relative" seeks to wield universality in much the same way as if I were to say, "that's unjust". Now 'just' is a universal. The universal in the proposition "that's unjust" lends power to my judgement here. But the same cannot be said of "that's culturally relative". For here, instead of making a universal judgement, I am imposing a conceptual construct. While the universal, justice, operates against the particular circumstance where it is negated (ie. injustice), this cannot be said of "that's culturally relative", because it would be absurd to say "that's culturally absolute" or "that's absolute culture". But it is not absurd to say something is just or unjust with all the rights and jurisdiction of the universal that goes with those terms. If something is cultural, it goes without saying that it is relative. It could not not be culturally relative. That is why the idea is jarring.

As to the objection that 'there are no universals', its not jarring, it sounds proper. It is a general statement that names something that does not exist, like 'there are no fairies'. Now 'fairies' names a species of creature which do not exist. But 'universals' names a common nature. In the sentence 'I am giving a talk' 'giving' and 'talk' are universals for I may give things and others may give things. Talking is common to each one of us.

Therefore we can say judgement is a universal. Good is a universal. Bad is a universal. And something may be good not because it is the opposite of bad. This is an abstract calculative way of thinking . Something is good because several or innumerable things are 'good' or partake of 'being good'. Same with bad. Innumerable things are bad, they constitute badness, therefore badness is a universal. Our law operates on this basis. It sees the commonality between cases and judges within this context. The universals are the precondition of all law.

So it seems that there are universals and not only that, they exist, and not only that, they are not culturally relative.

In support of the thesis that there are no universals I would say that universals are apriori, not aposteriori. In other words, they are givens of reason not experience. In support of the cultural relativity doctrine I would say that universals can differ culturally; what is liked by one culture is disliked by another. Liking is universal, but what is liked may have an important cultural dimension that needs to be taken account of. The idea of cultural relativity therefore has a place, but it is misplaced if we wield the idea as a basis of reasoning, or as an objection to it.

Now before we come on to the morality and universality we need to have something else in mind. Reason.

Now reason is not just a universal, one among the many, it is the universal par excellence. I am talking about reason here in the broadest sense of the Greek logos, which means the word that gathers and brings together. Not the French raison, which is heartless, of which the symbol is the guillotine. The great symbol of logos is Christ, the one who unites heaven and earth and triumphs over death and darkness. Reason includes the whole person. If I enjoin you to 'be reasonable!' I am calling on you to think with your heart and your head, not to be one-sided or partisan. Being rational is not necessarily being reasonable.

Reason has a unique status as a universal. Its universality is not merely verbal, but relates to truth, to what potentially or actually is.

Reason accompanies what may be said to be universally true. Now what may be said to be universally true, for instance, 'abortion is wrong', because it is murder, may be controversial; true or not, reason needs to operate on either side of the controversy if the truth is to come to light. Reason adjudicates the extent to which judgements are of universal import with respect to truth. Reason and truth govern together, for reason that is false is hardly reasonable and truth that is unreasonable may hardly be said to be true. It is the reason in our language (and our thought) that forms the universal with respect to the truth.

While as Russell said, our language is full of universals, we cannot state anything without recourse to words which are universals. But with regard to reason forming the universals with respect to the truth it may be said that not all universals are equal. Some universals are universal in a mainly linguistic sense which from the point of view of the universal reason is superficial and trivial. Some universals are universal in a sense that enlightens the understanding. Reason guides us in this discernment between universals and their importance. For instance, the universal 'like' is less important than 'love', the universal 'good' is more important that the universal 'bad' and so on. This is a matter for the discernment of reason. And who discerns? Philosophy does, the philosopher does. Philosophy is the discipline of reason.

Having briefly considered the relation then between reason and truth we must now consider the third aspect: authority. Reason is authoritative. The more reasonable something is, the more authoritative it is. Reason, in the comprehensive sense of logos, may be absolutely authoritative, for our understanding is such that we are able to recognise the absolute authority of reason, without it being unreasonable. An authority which tries to displace reason will be not be absolute, but absolutist - that is, tyrannical. We heed reason because of its authority. We are obedient to reason above all, because of its authority. Only reason can wield authority without authoritarianism. This is because it is actually the authority of our own understanding enlightening our mind. It is not an authority which bears down on us from without, like that of a King or Law, but the authority of good sense, which is the best kind of authority and the only true kind. Reason alone has the eponymous 'last word' on a matter.

Now we might be thinking, 'but what about the "view from outside"?' What about cultures that don't recognise reason the way we do? This is the doubt that reason is culturally relative, that it is a white-man thing. But if we harbour such doubt we should not forget that reason is a project, not an idol that demands the sacrifices of obedience. It is therefore only reasonable that reason be open to the margins and the outside. It is logical next step. The margins and the outside are only perceptible from within reason. Reason is of its nature never fanatical, for then it would not be reasonable. Reason is inclusive, and reason alone is inclusive as part of its authority and universality. When people see reason they see the world in the right light.

The enemy of reason is ignorance. Reason seeks to banish ignorance, but it cannot do so by force - although force may be the lesser of two evils (hence the Just War theory). There tend to be two main schools of thought on this score. One thinks of mankind as naturally reasonable. The other thinks of man as naturally ignorant. The first school of thought is that of the modern developed world. It believes reason is natural and life is progressing. The second school is Medieval and believes that reason has its work cut out for it; it believes that reason is like a light in the dark and that ignorance can snuff it out forever; and that there is no middle road: if you are not an upholder of reason you are on the side of the Barbarians, or you may as well be. In short, reason is not just naturally occurring, not the natural state of affairs; if anything it is an achievement of education. This is the Antique philosophical view too.

Another point should be added which is germane to the question of universals and morals. Reason has traditionally gone hand-in-hand with faith. By 'faith' I do not refer synonymously to belief, but to where we stake our reason. For instance, in the example just given with respect to reason: on which side do we stake our reason? Are we like Chamberlain, trusting in the natural good of man (that Hitler is harmless and most likely means well) or are we like Churchill, trusting that people will do the stupid or self-serving thing given half the chance. This is not a matter of opinion or reflection. You can see from the way you live which side you are on.

Faith is the existential or practical side of reason if you like, distinct from it but not wholly different. Our reason is staked in a way of life, which is also the life we live, the language we use, and understanding that is a result. For our form of life is elaborated in and by our language in every sense.

Are morals universal? We can see that they are in that justice, law, good and bad refer to many ways of life. While there are universals but morality is not the same everywhere. For uniformity is one interpretation of universality, but is not the same thing as it.

Are there no universal moral beliefs? This is really the question that we most wonder about when on this subject of universality and morality.

To say there are no universal moral beliefs, and to hold purely to anarchy, to principlelessness is to sacrifice the principle of reason, for nothing. It is a position which is therefore non-intellectual, unintelligible and while seeming like a faith, is not one. Another way of holding that there are no universal moral beliefs is to say so on the empirical basis of looking around to see if there are any or not and reporting back. But this can only give you the current state of affairs and can give no opinion qua reason. This is a sub-philosophical view.

That is not to say it is wrong. Merely to say that it cannot know if it is right or wrong, which belongs to reason to judge. Empirical data is only authoritative within reason, not instead of it.

Are there any universal moral beliefs? This is a question reason must ask of itself. In other words, we must ask it of ourselves. Certainly, as we have seen, reason has at least the appearance of universality about it, even if we are sceptics; and reason certainly has a universalising power about it. Reason makes for a better world. The Western world is staked on this claim. Reason protects from the barbarism of tribal rule - the medieval world was staked on this claim and laid the ground of an ordered and just society for the modern world. In an echo of the medieval world, the modern declaration of human rights - that people have a right to freedom from torture, tyranny and a right to express themself and exert themself in reasonable ways - aims to keep the encroaching darkness at bay and draw an ever-widening circle of light around mankind. But we have to be careful, for to adhere too strictly to reason becomes unreasonable, similarly justice can be merciless and cruel. Reason has to keep that human element if it not to become oppressive itself, as in Kafka's Castle or later in reality, in East Germany and Mao's China.

In a country like Australia today we have great reservations about expressing universal beliefs and we express disillusionment with the idea of such things. However philosophy for us needs to start - not terminate - here. Part of our disillusionment is the presumption that we need a common point of view in order for a universal moral belief to be valid.

Is universal moral belief a democratic matter? Does it depend on a common point of view, in other words, on a consensus? It would seem so. At one time, for instance, a consensus backed the death penalty. But times changed and the death penalty was abolished. But are there principles at stake here too? Just because the death penalty was abolished did not mean people were more tolerant and sympathetic to the needs and values of violent rapists and cold-blooded murderers. The opposite perhaps, for it could be argued that the duly elected government abolished the death penalty in order to be less like such criminals. In other words, to be more reasonable. So there is a principle here! A principle of reason.

How can we clarify this principle of reason, if indeed it holds out to us, as it seems to do, the possibility (the possibility at least if not the actuality) of universal moral beliefs and values?

Note something important here about our presumption that we need a common point of view in order for a universal moral belief to be valid. The principle of consensus which would give us a common voice which alone (because all together) could voice universal moral beliefs is derived from reason. Indeed it is one of reason's - that is humanity's - great achievements, historically speaking. It was decided long ago - by the Church Fathers principally - that if reason were not tagged to the common voice - to Everyman - it was not reasonable. This was what Nietzsche detested about Christianity, its democratic spirit. But democracy, like reason is a hard task. And the point is that in order for there to be a universal moral belief, there does not need to be a consensus on the matter. That said, in our time, a universal moral belief would surely need to catch on, to be consensual, that is, approved by reasonable people.

The end of reason, to which therefore universal moral beliefs are ordained, is a universal: the good. The good presupposes for us the common good, not that of an elite. The good presupposes happiness too. A good which is not also happy is hardly good enough. It is to this end that we talk of universal moral beliefs, or try to articulate what they might be, and to overcome our disillusionment with the whole question of universality and morality.

But where do we begin? And upon what authority? If moral belief is not reducible to what most people think, to consensus, as I've argued, then who should decide? Who are the experts in this area, what do they say and why don't we listen? Given, as I've argued, that moral belief is tied to the universality of reason, if a moral belief is not universal how moral is it? The whole rhetoric of human rights, for instance, says it doesn't matter if you are a Slavic nationalist or a pious Muslim, the same rules apply to you as to your neighbour and your women-folk; in other words the canons of moral belief are more elementary and more human than whatever else it is that you believe, and that they come first.

Notice the educational dimension here (in this example and in the whole idea of morality and universality). This educational dimension is controversial. The Human Rights activist has to say (although it will be put 'in not so many words') that the Slavic nationalist is ignorant of the moral code and needs to learn that it is wrong to believe his Muslim neighbours should be shot. Lack of Human Rights is lack of Enlightenment. The Muslim cleric who gives no credence to tolerance and teaches that it is from the Devil needs to learn otherwise. The modern rhetoric of Human Rights takes the educational task for granted. There are many too who see the rhetoric of human rights as an alien imposition, a conspiracy of the West, a neo-imperialistic project. How are we to judge who is right here? And upon what authority?

We should not just assume (with the enemies of Human Rights) that this educational aspect of universal morality is elitist ('we are better than you', 'we know best'), but rather that it is hierarchical. There is an important distinction between the two, perhaps a moral distinction.

The question of hierarchy dates back to the time of the Church Fathers, 'hierarchy' was a word coined by St. Denys (Pseudo-Dionysius) in the sixth century. The Church has always thought about universal morality in terms of hierarchy, without it having anything to do with elitism. For instance, it recognises degrees of disorder in the human person in the distinction between venial and mortal sin; one is worse than the other. It teaches 7 cardinal virtues in ascending order. Temperance is good, but justice requires it; vengeance can be satisfying but forgiveness is better, and so on. The Church teaches that the intellectual or theological virtues rank above the moral virtues. At the same time, the crown of virtue, caritas, comes first in that it is the ground of the proper order. All this is hierarchical, ordering and ordaining human acts to the end of eternal beatitude, but it would be absurd to call it elitist. We need to distinguish between moral high-handedness - elitism - in the moral order (the sin of sanctimony in the Church) from hierarchy properly speaking. Returning to our example of Human Rights, we need to ask, which is it, morally high-handed or hierarchical? For the first destroys the educational enterprise, but the second is essential to it.

The defensiveness of the Human Rights lobby over charges of neo-Imperialism is symptomatic of something we should name. It bears on this whole question of morality and universality in an important way for us. I refer to the difficulty caused by the incompatibility between hierarchical moral beliefs and egalitarian and consensual political beliefs.

How are we to reconcile these two orders of thought (principled and hierarchical morality with egalitarian and consensual politics) when they can hardly be separated in life? This is a huge question. In thinking about it, we may wonder where it leads us if our kind of politics is out of sink with our kind of morality? Does it matter if our political system and moral judgement are dissociated? At the same time, of course, both our political system and our moral judgement pertain to reason. While hierarchical morals and democratic politics are incompatible they are not incommensurable, for they are both reasonable, up to a point.

I would say one more thing to finish. If moral belief is as much a matter of faith as of reason, as I've also argued, what that means is that we are already morally engaged some how. Living is a moral matter and the way we live reflects our moral beliefs; and therefore the question, 'How universal are they?' becomes the question 'How universal are we?' This question of moral universals is not a question one can step outside of and observe from some comfortable perch outside all moral perspective. We are in the question of morality and universality up to our ears (and over our heads).

Matthew Del Nevo is Dean of Studies at the Centre for Christian Spirituality in Sydney . Before emigrating to Australia in the 80s he worked in the L'Arche community at Trosly Breuil outside Paris and before that at the Four Homes of Mercy in Bethany near Jerusalem .