AUGUST 2005 - ISSUE 5 - ISSN 1448 - 632

MAXIMUS THE CONFESSOR'S CHRISTOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY

 

 

CULLAN WOODS - JOYCE

 

ABSTRACT

Maximus the Confessor is consistently a Christ-centered thinker of the seventh century who focuses on the importance of the incarnation in the deification of the human and the divinization of the cosmos.  The incarnation is an event that facilitates the ascetic’s gradual recognition that objects in the world have a divine source and finality. For Maximus, knowledge of Christ enables the recognition of objects in their true nature. Although seldom discussed, Maximus’ mystical epistemology is an important and interesting aspect of his theology.

Maximus the Confessor is widely acknowledged as the leading Chalcedonian theologian of the seventh century, [1] yet he has only recently been re-discovered in the west. [2]  He was influenced by mainstream orthodox theologians[3] and also some sources considered outside orthodoxy.[4] His theology was mainly formulated in response to queries; however, it contains consistent themes.[5] In this essay I will discuss his epistemology using McFarland’s article[6] and Maximus’ own texts. First I will note Maximus’ essentially Christocentric method for encountering the various issues. Then I will outline the relationship of Maximus’ pedagogical epistemology to the transformation of the passions and the sacramental result of this reordering.

What is the Knower composed of?

The human is a composite of body and soul. [7] The definition of the soul is based in the general Christian Platonic tradition. The soul is composed of two parts in Maximus, the rational part and the ‘more irrational’[8] part where the passions reside, also called the passionate parts of the soul. The irrational part of the soul is also divided into two, one part named the desiring and the other incensive, which is the motivational aspect of the soul[9].   The passions take their most permanent root in the irrational parts. However, the irrational parts are still open to recapitulation (transformation) through acceptance of God's will, and the application of the rationally ordered will to the continual conversion of the entire person through grace . The propensities within the soul to a degree determine the nature of the object and the association with the object of sense discrimination to which the soul applies attention.[10]

What is Maximus’ Epistemology?

This section of the essay will follow Ian McFarland’s article on Maximus’ epistemology. I will also introduce the concept of ‘natures’ or logoi (particular created natures)[11]. However, first one should be aware that the process of knowledge mirrors the ‘threefold’ pattern of theosis which I will generally follow in this essay:

Through the working out of the commandments the mind puts off the passions. Through the spiritual contemplation of visible realities it puts off impassioned thoughts of things. Through the knowledge of invisible realities it puts off contemplation of visible things. And finally this it puts off through knowledge of the Holy Trinity.[12]

Before moving onto the details of Maximus’ epistemology we must note the objects known: the natures. A nature is a principle possessing being. They are reflected in material creation. They have their source in the Logos but being distinct and numerous they are termed logoi. All principles are created by God, they are given being through the Logos. Natures have a “…participation in the divine properties...”.[13] They are essentially good,[14] and have their genesis, their continuity and end, in God, though they may be employed in a way contrary to their original purpose.  Though God ‘surrounds’ them it does not mean that a rational creature does not have the freedom to choose; the human person has freedom intrinsic to its nature (also known as passibility).[15] Not even by an act of free will can a logos violate its essential property of being, nor can another principle destroy it: only God can grant being.[16]  How a nature exists in the world may be altered according to a choice for good or evil. For Maximus the choice for good or evil is a choice for being or non-being.[17] It is in this aspect of neutrality (the ability to be subject to various different apprehensions) that a logos is encountered once the soul has begun to put off the impassioned thoughts. Hence once improper association has been put off then further movement towards the positive appropriation of sense objects may occur. Prior to this reordering, the association with and imprinting of negative habits onto the soul’s faculties through the senses is a cause of the continual inappropriate sensual associations with external sense objects. “God…brought creatures into being…so that they might participate in Him in proportion to their capacity…”[18] The importance of correct association with these principles underlies Maximus’ understanding of the world. Though creation has autonomous value and integrity it is still liable to misuse and misunderstanding. The neutrality of these natures means that in an incorrect encounter, the subject is led incorrectly by their incorrect apprehension of them, though it does not damage the principle reflected in the object.

Maximus’ Basic Epistemology

McFarland sums up Maximus’ epistemology regarding material and intelligible objects, in two distinct ways: “Knowing…involves an ascent from the particular data of sensory experience to the noetic realm of concepts.”[19] And: “[knowledge is not gathered solely] by means of a progressive abstraction from the concrete and particular, but through sustained and deliberate attention to the particular as it exists in and is illumined by Christ.”[20] Knowledge comes as a result of an abstracting from the realm of the senses into one of intellect. McFarland’s second quote takes into account the asceticism required in order to apprehend an object in its true nature. For Maximus, any projection onto an object of possible apprehension renders our perception of this object false or misleading. Therefore from Maximus’ most basic statements on how an object appears to the mind through the senses, the consideration is eminently ascetical. The degree to which we engage the world, having purified the mind of passions, is the degree to which we apprehend the objects of sense as they actually exist. However, the need for a mediator (Christ) is not negated after the recovery of the clearer use of our natural faculties.

The role of Christ assisting the knower[21]

For this section I will follow the text of Difficulty 10. When the disciples recognised Christ’s “great awesomeness…they passed over from the flesh to spirit, before they had put aside this fleshy life…”[22] This aspect of Maximus’ ascetical epistemology relates to the initial disengagement or purification of the soul from the passionate association with external objects. Objects known through passions are recognized in a false way not because they are inherently flawed, but because the soul, working out of the internal propensities, is unable to clearly recognize the object apart from the impositions of the soul. These are known as compounded thoughts.[23] A thought which imputes an extraneous factor onto an object that is simple and neutral in itself are said to associate with that object, not in itself, but as it is designated through the soul’s (passionate) propensities. In other words, the projection onto or improper mental use of an object, encounters it in a way distinct from its original natural simplicity. It is a movement or encounter contrary to nature.[24]  This movement of the soul is reordered through the keeping of the commandments. When the passions begin to subside, then through the agency of Christ one can begin to encounter the essential nature of the created principles through the Word.

The recognition of Christ as the creator and eschatological fulfilment of creation is a cause and a condition for the initial putting aside of the “fleshly life” which manifests in the imposition of impassionate thoughts onto objects. However, this initial detachment from sense pleasure is a partial purification; the subject does not yet encounter external objects in their purity. [25] The dispassionate intellect strives to encounter objects and their purpose clearly, though it is unable to through its own powers. Assisted striving may uncover objects in a simple way (the subject no longer associates with them with passions contrary to nature), but they cannot be stainlessly comprehended unless they are seen within their being grounded in the Word through whom they were created. “Apart from the Logos, our knowledge of creatures is distorted and imperfect. . .”[26]  Christ is the agent that reveals the nature and purpose of creation itself.

What role does Christ the Word play in this initial purification?

Ambiguum 10 uses the terms ‘recognized’ and ‘revealed’ that have a strong connotation of a hidden thing revealed through Christ. Christ reveals the “spiritual meanings [logoi] of the things that were shown to them…”[27] Christ reveals the proper end of objects by embodying the eschatological fulfilment of creation in himself. McFarland argues that Maximus holds the view that knowledge of the source and purpose of the nature of created objects is given only through the combination of the striving of the dispassionate soul towards knowledge of beings, and the condescension of Christ to creation.[28]  The process of emptying ourselves of passions imitates the incarnation: “By emptying themselves of passions they lay hold of the divine to the same [extent] as that to which, deliberately emptying himself of his own sublime glory, the logos of God truly became man.”[29] Once the logoi are encountered through the Word and seen in their original neutrality they can now be employed to a spiritual propensity rather than for the sake of sensual pleasure. The soul, occupied in Christ, now moves outward in response to the underlying purpose of natures, rather than the desire for objects of sense.[30]

When the soul encounters logoi in the way appropriate to their original purpose and creation, that is, as they are moving towards their creator who is their purpose of existence, this creation is seen as having its purpose in, and possessing attributes of, the divine. Maximus consistently reiterates that creation is good in itself inasmuch as it is from God. Moreover McFarland argues that the revelation of the purpose of creation also opens the way for the perception of God’s created attributes.[31]  Here he refers to actual participatory knowledge of the creature of the divine attributes (eternality, infinitude, wisdom, goodness etc). [32] These created realities include the attributes of the divine being given to creatures, such as goodness. These are seen in their proper context in the Word. The encounter with the divine attributes in beings is derived from the recognition of their corporate indwelling in Christ.

Knowledge of the created principles (logoi) through Christ

This level of knowledge after the stage of praktike corresponds to the stage of theoria, when, through the agency of the Word, the subject begins to encounter the logoi or principles of creation reflected in sensory objects in their relationship to the Word and all creation within the word.  McFarland notes that for Maximus the knowledge of the divine attributes in the logoi is not only a detached, purely conceptual recognition, but an actual participation or methexis.[33] The attributes revealed through the Word are created so they are not the final object of knowledge.[34] This is not yet an ecstatic knowing in God. Without the mediation of Christ through the assumption of our nature we cannot apprehend creation in its proper mode, let alone participate clearly in the divine attributes that are displayed through creation. Even in the final stage of theologia there is a mediated quality to the engagement with higher realities in Maximus’ thought. However, there is a strong element in Maximus in being able to ‘go beyond’ or encounter in a non-incarnated way, the divine Word.

Christ’s role in ecstatic knowledge[35]

Christ’s role in all aspects of knowing (which is a gradual and ascetic process) is both as mediator of divine knowledge[36], and as a guide accompanying the ascetic. Christ reveals to the intellect that desires to know God the knowledge of the divine inasmuch as the person may receive it. Louth points out that theologia, which is a description of the ecstatic reverence for God, is a state of being rather than an event.[37] This final stage of knowing is transformative.  In this state there is the encounter of the ground that underlies the logoi, the ground, giving life to, and guiding creation but in its ‘nakedness’. The transcendent ground is Christ the Word.[38] Within this final unknowing gnosis the possibility of effective description falls away: “Jesus’ status as the unapproachable light…far from constituting an exception to…God’s transcendence is the definitive witness to the divine unknowability.”[39] Though the final manner of assistance or description of theologia may be indescribable, that Christ is the pivotal element in this ‘final’ point[40], and that ecstatic knowledge of the trinity is transformative, is a consistent point of agreement among interpreters of Maximus.[41]

The Pedagogical Reordering of the Soul by Knowledge

The significant aspect that accompanies these stages of knowing is the pedagogical aspect present with a consistent dwelling on an object apprehended. We imitate or learn from the object of our observance. To know an object is to be transformed by it into its own image: this goes for the encounter with the most simple ‘object’ of contemplation, God, to sensual objects subject to compounded thoughts. So to abide consistently in impassioned thoughts, one comes to resemble those thoughts:

When the intellect gives attention to conceptual images of physical objects, it is assimilated to the configuration of each image. If it contemplates these objects spiritually, it is transformed in the various ways according to which of them it contemplates. But once it is established in God, it loses form and configuration altogether for by contemplating Him who is simple it becomes simple itself and wholly filled with spiritual radiance.[42]

When the divine is contemplated or participated in, we come to resemble the object and are deified in Christ, even as Christ became flesh.[43] The incarnation is the essential paradigm outlining the process of the gradual assent/ascent of the human to God. “God and man are paradigms one of another, that as much as God is humanised to man through love for mankind, so much is man able to be deified to God through love. . .”[44] Therefore the process of knowing an object is intimately connected with coming to an understanding of Christ, as well as the ascetic struggle.

The reordering through knowledge assumes the directed employment of the soul’s energy towards the object desired which results in the giving of attention. Maximus argues that the will is imperative for distinguishing between the passionate representation of things and the things themselves.[45]  The reordering of the will is simultaneous with the re-ordering of the other aspects of the soul. The soul cannot function naturally towards an object of goodness while any aspect of the soul is occupied, or primarily directed to, entanglement with a compounded projection. The intellect, the soul, comes to resemble the object of its sustained apprehension. Maximus uses the example of a seal: “A seal conforms to the stamp against which it is pressed”.[46]

The ‘Blessed Passion of Holy love’

The appropriation of the object within the subject does not remain at the level of intellect, even though the intellect may be the primary way we recognise God. The reordering of the soul takes place gradually and in various ways in the subject whose soul gradually ascends to the Divine.[47] This reordering through the purification and redirection of the desiring component of the soul is described by Louth as occurring through the ‘blessed passion of holy love’ that the soul becomes acquainted with.[48] The reordering is actually a re-unifying of the soul through love.[49] The soul begins to reorder itself according to the object that it now rests upon; she seeks out the object of her affection. When the habit becomes adapted to contemplation and the will is gradually reordered through grace, the seats of the soul become resonant with God. “The perfect soul is one whose affective drive is wholly directed to God.”[50] The soul, in the process, is no longer as concerned with maintaining a self-generated imposition upon a creation that has revealed itself in God. Instead she seeks out the ground of creation in Christ the Word made flesh. Christ is now planted within the deepest seat of the human and the human seeks him out in the world.

The Transformation of Passions in Maximus

The person engaging continually in ascetic effort with faith grows continually in grace and becomes a visible sign of the divine in the world, so that they act in the world in such a way that imitates the incarnation, and makes God known to the cosmos through them. The sacramentality of the deified ascetic is not an unusual element of early Christian monastic doctrine. Origen and the early desert fathers spoke of it in various forms such as transparency.[51] Cooper specifically argues for the presence of a sacramental effectivity within the subject that can bind others to God through this incarnated love. [52] To quote Maximus:  “By constant straining toward God, he becomes God and is called ‘a portion of God’ because he has become fit to participate in God.”[53]

Conclusion

Intimately bound up with knowledge of objects is the ascetical life. The transformation of the human person arises from Maximus’ understanding of the nature and mode of the incarnation. The incarnation is the essential paradigm outlining the process of the gradual assent of the human to God. Essential to this process of purification, however, is the ascetical life that aims at securing the abiding of Christ within the soul. The initial reordering of the soul through the observance of the commandments also secures the gradual disengagement from the passions that we incorrectly impute upon created natures. Secondly the understanding or participation in the divine attributes in created natures as mediated through the source of creation, the Word, is the second way in which we gradually assume our likeness to the divine. Finally we disengage even from these lofty contemplations and dwell within God through grace, thus becoming portions of God in Him. In every stage Christ as mediator and guide may be clearly seen –  without his presence the ascetical life could progress, but only partially and without ultimate success. Without the dual elements of Christ and ascetic effort the knowledge of external objects is deceptive and shadowy. This is a very interesting aspect of Maximus’ thought and worthy of greater discussion.

Bibliography

Berthold, George C. (trans.) Maximus Confessor. Selected Writings. Introduction by Jaroslav Pelikan (Paulist Press 1985)

Blowers, Paul. M and Wilken, Robert Louis. On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ. Selected Writings of St Maximus the Confessor (St Vladimir’s Seminary Press Crestwood, New York 2003)

Blowers, Paul M. “Maximus the Confessor, Gregory of Nyssa and the Concept of Perpetual Progress.” Vigiliae Christianae 46/1 (1992) 151- 171

______________ “Gentiles of the Soul: Maximus the confessor on the Substructure and Transformation of the Human Passions”, Journal of Early Christian Studies 6 (1996) 57- 85

Cooper, Adam. The Body in St Maximus the Confessor. Holy Flesh Wholly Deified. (Oxford University Press. 2005)

Greer, Rowan A. Origen (SPCK, London, 1979)

Louth, Andrew. Maximus the Confessor. Early Christian Fathers (Routledge, London 1996)

____________  “Dogma and Spirituality in St Maximus the Confessor”, in: Prayer and Spirituality in the Early Church. ed. Pauline Allen, Raymond Canning and Lawrence Cross, with B. Janelle Caiger (Australian Catholic University, Brisbane 1998)

__________ “Recent Research on St. Maximus the Confessor: A Survey”, St Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 42/1 (1998) 76-84

__________ The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition. From Plato to Denys (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1981)

Meyendorff, John. Christ in Eastern Christian thought (St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, Crestwood, New York 1987)

McFarland, Ian A. “Developing an Apophatic Christocentrism: Lessons from St. Maximus the Confessor” Theology Today 60/2 (2003) 200-214

Neil, Bronwen. “The Blessed Passion of Holy Love. Maximus Confessor’s Spiritual Psychology” Austalian E Journal of Theology. Issue 2, 2004 cited: http://dlibrary.acu.edu.au/research/theology/ejournal/aejt_2/bronwen_neil.htm

Nellas, Panayiotis. Deification in Christ. The Nature of the Human Person. Translated By Norman Russell. (St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, Crestwood NY 1987)

St Nikodimos and St Makarios, The Philokalia, the Complete text. Volume TwoTranslated from the Greek and Edited by G.E.H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard and Kalistos Ware. (Faber and Faber, London 1981)

Thunberg, Lars. Man and the Cosmos. The Vision of St Maximus the Confessor (St Vladimir’s University Press, Crestwood NY 1985)

Tsirpanlis, Constantine N. Introduction to Eastern Christian Thought and Orthodox Theology. Theology and Life Series (The Liturgical Press, Minnesota 1991) 

Yeago, David S. “Jesus of Nazareth and Cosmic Redemption: The Relevance of St. Maximus the Confessor.” Modern Theology 12/ 4 (1996) 163-193

 

Footnotes

[1] J. Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought  (St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, New York. 1975) 131. This is a dialectical statement, meaning that he is the leading Chalcedonian writer of the period. Other personalities featured in the sixth century such as Severus of Antioch were at times opponents of the Chalcedon though still solid theologians. Other authorities around the same time as Maximus are accorded lesser status. 

[2] A. Louth, “Recent Research on St. Maximus the Confessor: A Survey”, St Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 42/1 (1998), 67.

[3] Maximus was strictly Chalcedonian and he was indebted to the Cappadocian’s understanding of the terms used in Trinitarian theology for his reading of the council. There were other influences on his ascetical theology such as Pseudo-Marcarius who is important in Maximus’ more holistic view of the spiritual life as well as his transformation of Evagrius.

[4] Maximus was influenced by Origenist Neoplatonism, principally Evagrius Ponticus. He was also the great re-interpreter of Pseudo- Dionysius whom he used consistently across his various literary forms.

[5] Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought, 131. His thought is scattered among the various chapters and letters of his corpus and does not appear systematically. However, there are some features, that can be consistently observed throughout the various literary texts; creation is good, the fall was a matter of free will that caused humanity death, this corruption was not of human nature (logoi) but occurred at the (level of) ‘mode’ (tropos/ mode of abidance/action) of our existence. Furthermore our ‘mode’ was restored to its inclination proper to nature (towards our creator) and deified in Christ’s incarnation, death and resurrection. By Christ sharing in our human nature, which Maximus refers to as a Microcosm of the universe, he restored and perfected the entire cosmos (material and intelligible). Maximus also employed an apophatic method (negative theology) to describe how we know God. This is in contrast to participation in the inner being of the Trinity, which was generally an Evagrian/Origenist view. He inherited the mainstream monastic spiritual theology, principally from Evagrius but also Pseudo-Macarius. Maximus inherits his three graded view on the ascent to God from Evagrius. The categories of asceticism are graded first to last; the first is Practike; the second, Theoria; and the third is Theologia.

[6] Ian A. McFarland. “Developing an Apophatic Christocentrism: Lessons from St. Maximus the Confessor”, Theology Today 60/2 (2003) 200-214.

[7] I will identify the soul as the prime mover observing as established the relationship between body and soul as interdependent. This can be cited in Maximus anti- origenist work: Ambiguum 7 cited in: Paul. M Blowers and Robert Louis Wilken (trans.), On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ. Selected Writings of St Maximus the Confessor (St Vladimir’s Seminary Press Crestwood, New York. 2003). Ambiguum 10, (also known as Difficulty 10 in A. Louth, Maximus the Confessor, Early Christian Fathers, [Routledge, London 1996]) contains an element that could disrupt this neat catergorisation of soul and body, the sense organs are said to posses a natural faculty for pleasure. Does this indicate an objective sensate consiousness that enjoys pleasure or just a pleasure that arises due to the propensity within the human for objects? The latter, in this he follows main stream monastic psychology.

[8] Ad Thalassium 1. in: Blowers—Wilkin, On The Cosmic Mystery, 97-98.

[9] Difficulty 10, in Louth, Maximus,148-149.

[10] Difficulty 10, in: Louth, Maximus, 100-101. This is a crude description but is generally observable in these sections.

[11] McFarland’s article uncovers a strong but slightly obscure theme in Maximus’ theology. His discussion takes account of Maximus’ epistemology well; however, I think that knowledge, for Maximus, requires a stainless and dispassionate knowing of an object. McFarland acknowledges this; however, I think that the most basic description of how Maximus sees the mind encountering the world needs to take explicit notice of the element of the ascetical. There can be no account of the process of knowing without referencing the process of purification of the soul. 

[12] Centuries on Love (CL) Book I chapter 94.  In: G. Berthold (trans.), Maximus Confessor, Selected Writings  (Paulist Press, 1985), 45. (unless other wise noted the translation will be taken from the Philocalia translation: St Nikodimos and St Makarios, The Philokalia, the Complete text. Volume TwoTranslated from the Greek and Edited by G.E.H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard and Kalistos Ware. (Faber and Faber, London 1981)There are clearly four stages here, these are distinctions within the basic threefold pattern of basic ascetical theosis doctrine. The first stage corresponds to Praktike the second and third to Theoria, the fourth to Theologia.

[13] Blowers--Wilkin. On the Cosmic Mystery, 58

[14] CL IV 3 in: Berthold, Maximus Confessor, Selected Writings, 75. To grant existence belongs to no one but God, hence to exist or not is not the choice of the Logoi.

[15] Ambiguum 7 in: Blowers—Wilkin, On the Cosmic Mystery,50.

[16] CL III 29.

[17] “It means that someone who had the ability to direct the steps of his soul unswervingly toward God voluntarily exchanged what is better, his true being, for what is worse, non-being.” Ambiguum 7 in: Blowers—Wilkin, On the Cosmic Mystery, 61.

[18] CL III 46.

[19] McFarland. “Apophatic Christocentrism”, 202

[20] McFarland, “Apophatic Christocentrism”, 214. The first quote tries to sum up Maximus’ basic epistemology as a bare psychology. McFarland tries to posit it as independently as possible. However, because Maximus is Christocentric and ascetical, it would be debatable if an account of his epistemology could be disassociated from the ascetical life, and the grace of God (though McFarland’s summary was never meant to encompass Maximus’ entire outlook). The second quote therefore gives a clearer account of the encounter with the world as Maximus sees it, that is, while we are able to have partial knowledge of the principles from our own natural effort. This knowledge is incomplete at best (McFarland, “Apophatic Christocentrism” 205). This point is brought up in regards to the Apophatic method of coming to know God. In Maximus, however, it is specifically related to the way in which one encounters the created principles in themselves. I think the quote is still valid in this context. 

[21] McFarland cites Ambiguum 10 translated by Louth (Maximus, 96-154, principally 109-110) as his main text for the discussion of Christ-centered epistemology. I will examine the first stage which corresponds to Praktike (the purification of the gross mental and bodily passions through keeping the commandments). Maximus sets out his Christocentric and ascetical epistemology as a commentary on the transfiguration of the Lord which includes a discussion of the three stages specifically as they relate to our knowledge of divine things. This signifies the co-presence of effort and grace in the movement towards recognition of the origin and purpose of created objects.

[22] Ambiguum 10 in: Louth, Maximus, 109.

[23] CL II 84: “Some thoughts are simple, others compound. The simple are without passion, but the compound are with passion, as composed of passion plus representation.” Though a gathering of simple thoughts seems to follow a compound, in this case the representations that are simple are together with, but distinct from, the passionate representation: “For not all thoughts which accompany an impassioned thought are themselves passionate…”  This means that the moment of passion is accompanied by many other simple thoughts that may in turn contribute to the flame of passion. However, they do so based on their being ‘picked up’ by the passion, never by their actual nature.

[24] CL II 16, CL IV 14. I would term this selfishness or self centred-ness for Maximus. It represents how we go after our own self-fabricated desires rather than being an act of selfishness as such.

[25] Ambiguum 10 in: Louth. Maximus. 109.

[26] McFarland, “Apophatic Christocentrism”, 205.

[27] Ambiguum 10 in: Louth, Maximus, 109.

[28] McFarland, “Apophatic Christocentrism”, 204.

[29] Maximus, On the Lord’s Prayer 97-106 cited in: Louth, Maximus, 34. [Brackets my own]

[30] “When the intellect has shaken off its many opinion s about created things, then the inner principle of truth appears clearly to it, providing it with a foundation of real knowledge and removing its former preoccupations as though removing scales from the eyes…  For an understanding of scripture that does not go beyond the literal meaning and a view on the sensible world that relies exclusively on sense perception, are indeed scales blinding the soul’s visionary faculty and preventing access to the pure Logos of truth.” Second Century on Theology 75. 

[31] McFarland, “Apophatic Christocentrism”, 203.

[32] McFarland, “Apophatic Christocentrism”, 206.

[33] McFarland, “Apophatic Christocentrism”, 202. I think that the intellect needs to be more clearly defined, McFarland has not reiterated the interdependent composition of the soul, hence his statement that the apprehension of the Divine attributes is primarily intellectual needs some qualification. If the apprehension of the logoi in theoria is participatory, it is a participation without a truly ecstatic movement from the soul, it is not the final stage of knowledge for Maximus. I think that this is where McFarland mistakes the category of the apprehension of the divine attributes in the Logoi, with knowledge of God. This is not a straight forward error, as Maximus states clearly that we apprehend God from ‘his magnificent work and his providence for beings’ (CL I 96). But Maximus also has a distinct stage of contemplation of the Trinity in the absence of such attributes. Though the knowledge in the contemplation of the Trinity is not to understand God, one never penetrates into his being. Nevertheless this contemplation has a powerful effect on the soul, imbuing it with a love for what it cannot understand (CL I 100).

[34] Centuries on Theology I, 48.

[35] McFarland  is very brief on the final unknowing knowing of the divine essence. Although he is at great pains to describe the process of knowledge regarding the divine attributes, he does not offer an extensive opinion on the contemplation of the divine essence which is distinct from the attributes.: “Sabbaths of Sabbaths are the spiritual peace of the rational soul which, having withdrawn the mind even from the more divine principles which are in beings, dwells entirely in God alone in loving ecstasy and has rendered itself by mystical theology totally immobile in God” (Chapters on Knowledge I, 39) There is a distinction between apprehending the divine attributes and the contemplation of the trinity.  Maximus is clear that this cannot be comprehended; nevertheless it is an object of contemplation without actual participation in the being that is contemplated. The debate that Maximus had with Evagrius and the other Origenists is an example of this. The debate was not on the issue of what this type of knowledge is, in both cases; a supreme ignorance was used to describe the basic thought of both parties. The distinction between the Origenists and Maximus, was that the instance of supreme ignorance was a participation in the being of the trinity for the Origenists (an ever expanding ignorant knowledge), whereas Maximus and Pseudo-Dionysius disagreed with Origenism on the point of an actual participation in the divine being but agreed that the being of God is ‘known’ by his incomprehensibility.

[36] Lars Thunberg,  Man and the Cosmos. The Vision of St Maximus the Confessor. (St Vladimir’s University Press, Crestwood NY 1985)80.

[37] Louth, Maximus, 37.

[38] McFarland, “Apophatic Christocentricism”, 208.

[39] McFarland, “Apophatic Christocentricism”, 211.

[40] There is no final point of utter divinization in this life for Maximus, there is a continual growth from ‘Glory to Glory’ influenced by Gregory of Nyssa. Paul M. Blowers, “Maximus the Confessor, Gregory of Nyssa and the Concept of Perpetual Progress”, Vigiliae Christianae 46/1 (1992) 151- 171. Centuries on Theology  II 77.

[41] McFarland, “Apophatic Christocentricism”, 212 cites A. Louth, Wisdom of the Byzantine Church: Evagrios of Pontus and Maximus the Confessor (Columbia: University of Missouri, 1998) 24.

[42] CL III, 97. Cited in McFarland, “Apophatic Christocentricism”, 203.

[43] Cooper, The Body in St Maximus the Confessor, Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford University Press, 2005) 46.

[44] Difficulty 10. in: Louth. Maximus. 101. This position is distinct from Origen’s which identified the original resemblance based our participation in the Word as an agent in creation rather than the Word incarnate. In other words the incarnate Word was not the paradigm for our resemblance to God, but our participation in the Word itself: Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition. From Plato to Denys (Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1981) 70.

[45] CL III 43. Ambiguum 7 in: Blowers—Wilkin, On The Cosmic Mystery, 52.

[46] Blowers—Wilkin, On The Cosmic Mystery, 52.

[47] Blowers—Wilkin, On the Cosmic Mystery, 51.

[48] Louth, Maximus, 40-43

[49] Blowers, “Gentiles of the Soul”, 77.

[50] CL III 98 (trans. Berthold), 75.

[51] Rowan A. Greer, Origen (SPCK, London, 1979) xiii.

[52] Cooper, The Body in St Maximus the Confessor, 47. Though this quote was in reference to the Body as mediator, as Cooper argues the body and soul are interdependent in Maximus. Of course the soul is the prime mover, but the body is by no means a passive entity, I think the quote can be employed safely in this context.

[53] Ambiguum 7 in: Blowers—Wilkin, On the Cosmic Mystery, 56.

 

Cullan Woods - Joyce is completing a Bachelor of Theology (Honours), in the School of Theology, ACU National at Banyo.

Email: Cullan Joyce [cullanjoyce@gmail.com]

 

 

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