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Review Essay by Matthew C Ogilvie |
Abstract
By going beyond superficial disagreements to a more penetrating analysis of key issues, Michael Ruse’s book articulates significant parallels between Darwinism and Christianity. Ruse answers his book’s central question by showing how a Darwinian can hold to a range of Christian beliefs with intellectual honesty. Ruse explains how central Christian beliefs regarding original sin and the problem of pain can be appropriated reasonably within a Darwinian worldview. However, this essay shows that further questions can be raised as to how a traditional Christian may respond to the Darwinian interpretation of these beliefs. This essay regards highly Ruse’s achievement in showing how a Darwinian can be a Christian. At the same time, we pose the converse question, “Can a Christian be a Darwinian?” In answering that question, this essay shows that there remain some complications regarding a full Christian appropriation of Darwinism. We noted some difficulties with reductionist philosophy and epistemic limitations found within Darwinian methodology. This essay concludes that even though Ruse has shown the way for an honest appropriation of Christianity by a Darwinian, there remains more work to be done to enable the full appropriation of Darwinism by Christians.
Introduction
Having contributed much as a leading
philosopher of evolution, most notably in Monad to
Man
(1996) and Mystery of Mysteries (1999), Michael
Ruse ventures into theology by asking “Can a Darwinian
be a Christian?”
As a Darwinian, Ruse answers the question skilfully in a compact
book that ranges over a number of engaging topics -- from separate
chapters in which Darwinism and Christianity are explained, to
reflections on the impact of naturalism, the nature of humans,
the meaning of “design,” the experience of evil/pain,
Christian ethics and human freedom. Rather than providing a comprehensive
summary of the book, this essay shall explore some of Ruse’s
ideas before pointing to problems with the first question in
our title.
Given his atheist beliefs,
Ruse’s answer to the central question is surprising, but
understandable given his fundamental rejection of any a priori
conflict between science and theology. He appeals to Christian
thinkers like Augustine and Aquinas, who would have found such
a conflict appalling. He also emphasises that neither Luther
nor Calvin were Biblical literalists, and that they supported
science, even when it challenged long-held readings of Scripture
(ix, 53). Collaterally, Ruse exposes creationists as non-traditional
Christians, though one would also propose that scientists who
claim a necessary conflict between science and theology do not
stand within the best scientific traditions. One finds it helpful
to note, for example, that Darwin did not abandon his personal
Christian belief because of evolutionary theory. Twenty years
before The Origin of Species was published, Darwin’s
agnosticism was formed by: (i) his exposure to higher criticism
of the Bible, (ii) his disregard for the Old Testament’s
image of God, and (iii) his belief that the “fixed laws
of nature” made impossible those miracles upon which Christianity
supposedly rested (Darwin 1958, 85-6). Darwin’s Origin
of Species served only to reinforce, not generate, his agnosticism.
This leaves open the question of whether Darwinian thinking necessarily
involves rejection of theism.
The Problem of Pain
Ruse’s work articulates significant parallels between Christianity and Darwinism, one of which is the problem of pain. Christianity and Darwinism emphasise the presence of pain in the world. Ruses proposes that evil and suffering exist not as “coincidental givens” but as essential parts of life on earth and that Christianity and Darwinism are united in understanding evil as motivation for betterment. Darwinian theory sees suffering as motivation for living beings to overcome pain through evolution. In Christian thinking, Ruse (133-4) advances Hick’s argument that evil is necessary for our moral development. Without evil, we would lack motivation to create a better world. Ruse emphasises the image of Jesus on the cross, and we may detect an isomorphism between the Christian image of Jesus asking his Father God why he has forsaken him (allowed such evil) and the Darwinist image of living beings struggling with mother nature, which has allowed pain and suffering. Christianity and Darwinism can unite in proposing that we strive to overcome suffering, and make ourselves better (more evolved) in the process.
One notes, though, that despite this position’s attraction, it still challenges some basic tenets of traditional theism. For example, if God is supposed to be omnibenevolent and omnipotent, it could be proposed that such a God would, or should, have created a world in which evil was not necessary.
Original Sin
Ruse also proposes harmony between Darwinism and Christianity on the normally unpopular doctrine of original sin. He concludes that “original sin is part of the biological package.” Human qualities are often contaminated by selfishness and undue self-interest. In Darwinist terms, “original sin” means that, from our parents, we inherit characteristics that include deep selfishness and tendencies towards greed, lust and dishonesty. From a Darwinian perspective, libertines who impregnate many women, greedy men who keep all the resources for their own families, and dishonest people who lie and cheat their way to the top are more likely to reproduce than honest altruists (209-10). One finds this point reinforced by Thornhill and Palmer’s contention (2000) that social evils, such as rape, find their ultimate explanation in the evolution of men. Ruse clarifies that evolution does not result in total depravity in humankind, but that over our self-centredness and selfishness, is overlaid a genuine moral action that guides our behaviour. According to Ruse, both Christianity and Darwinism conceive humans as inherently “sinful,” with goodness present and struggling for control (209-10).
Again, Ruse articulates common ground between Christianity and Darwinism, but this is not without further challenge to traditional Christian doctrines. This conception of original sin may be attractive as an empirical verification of a Christian doctrine. Darwinism certainly supports the human possession of “sin” as part of our nature and that this may be “original.” However, one would note that Darwinism holds this nature to be intrinsic to humans – thus conflicting with Christian notions of a “fall” that came “after” humans were created in a state of original rectitude. This challenge is related to the view of humanity’s place in the animal world. Ruse points out that the fossil record reveals that our ancestors' evolution was marked by scavenging behaviour – “humans were the jackals of the primate world.” Such a view of humanity, evolutionarily accurate as it may be, says much about the dignity of the human person – and it may say much about the nature and behaviour of people who are descended from “mid-range primates who came down out of the trees and went into the garbage and offal business” (71, 141). Such an attitude, while put in blunt terms, reveals some of the full force of Darwinian-evolutionary theory. While the less than noble origins of humans can be reconciled with the dignity of humans today, it is not so easy to reconcile a view of humans as scavenging offal-collectors with the idea of creation (general or special) held within even moderate Christianity. Human origins would be an area in which much more would need to be done if Darwinism and Christianity were to be reconciled fully.
Philosophical Issues
As for the content of Darwinism
and Christianity, Ruse enlightens much common ground. However,
after immersing oneself in Darwinism, Biblical studies and theology,
one would agree that the fundamental problem in the Christianity-Darwinism
divide is philosophical (12ff). One may consider that, until
the publication of the Origin of Species, evangelical Christians
generally surrendered literalist Bible readings to scientific
discoveries, most notably the geological discovery that the earth
was 4 ½ billion years old. Evangelicals, even arch-fundamentalists
like Bryan (Dobson and Hindson 1986, 56), then reinterpreted
the Genesis “days” to mean “long periods,”
which allowed scientific integrity to coexist with traditional
theism. However, for many, Darwinism’s reductionist philosophy
of life eliminated a transcendent creator. Ruse clarifies that,
at the ontological level, Darwinian reductionism explains the
many in terms of the few, and at the methodological level it
explains the bigger in terms of the smaller. One proposes that
this is the basic clash with fundamentalism, which tries to explain
the small in terms of the big. Ruse writes on human origins that
we are ordered and can function in ways that are not possible
for other animals. But this is not because we have something
different at the substance level, but rather that we are different
because of the way that we are put together. “The whole
point about reductionism is that one explains the complex in
terms of the simple,” which means ultimately that what is
special about humans is not so transcendent after all and that
the difference is made immanently, not transcendentally (77ff,
114).
For the Christian theologian troubled by reductionism, the objections of Gould and Lewontin may be appealing. One notes briefly Gould’s argument for an “expanded Darwinism” and Lewontin’s (1991, 81) condemnation of reductionism as “This individualistic view of the biological world [that] is simply a reflection of the ideologies of the bourgeois revolutions of the eighteenth century that place the individual at the center of everything.” It is not accidental that both Lewontin and Gould come from backgrounds sensitive to reductionist excesses, that they are regarded as ideological mythologists by some orthodox Darwinians (Thornill and Palmer 2000, 116-8), and that reductionism looks unkindly upon Marxists, feminists, constructivists and the like (ix). Theologians who wish to make an honest appropriation of evolutionary theory need to ask “If we are dialoguing with evolution, with which theory are we dealing?” It may be much easier for theologians to appropriate theories such as Gould’s and Lewontin’s – though facility has never guaranteed accuracy. One would say, however, that in showing how a reductionist Darwinian of integrity can also be a Christian, Ruse’s achievement has been all the more significant.
If Ruse has shown how a Darwinian
can be a Christian, one can argue that more may need to be done
for a Christian, especially an orthodox one, to be a Darwinian.
One can note some problems in need of resolution, which come
from the subject matter and philosophy of Christianity. The central
problem would be human evolution. I am always struck by Bronowski’s
comparison (1973, 26) of ourselves and our ancestors from two
million years ago and of the animals of the African Savannah
from the same times. While the animals would be much the same,
the humans and their ancestors would hardly be recognisable to
one another, such has been the extraordinarily rapid evolution
of the human species. That rapid evolution has involved more
than the perceptible body of human biology. Rather, it has occurred
more in the psychic evolution of humans. Moreover, evolution,
as it was understood by Darwin, has not really adapted the human
species to any one environment. Rather, human intelligence fits
us to any environment that we choose, for intelligence enables
us to change our environment, rather than our environment changing
us. Unfortunately, Darwin could not take account of psychic elements
in evolution because he was epistemically limited to the material
imagination and the cultural assumptions of his time. Without
resorting to pious sentimentality -- mind, intelligence and “spirit”
may have more to contribute to evolutionary theory than some
evolutionists are prepared to admit. While the reticence of some
Darwinians to ask some questions may be because these issues
tend towards questions of spirit and spirituality, one would
propose that a solid philosophy of mind can not only help apply
Darwinism to Christian thinking, but it may actually be a contribution
to evolutionary thought. The importance of human mind and its
transcendence of the biological are seen in Ruse's own work in
his reflections on birth control (168-9, 203) – something
humans do out of intelligent choice rather than evolutionary
instinct. It is seen again in Ruse’s contrast of “biological
altruism” (actions that benefit others but with the object
of one’s own reproductive ends) and “moral altruism”
(actions done for another’s benefit only because they are
the right thing to do) (187-95). It may be that those blessed
as Christian saints may be Darwinian flops. Yet the sociality
of humanity and the development of our intelligence negates this
mutual exclusion. Recognition of this reality helps overcome
a limit in classic Darwinism, and the identification of “heroes”
or pivotal groups as responsible for evolution opens up exciting
possibilities for Christian reflection (Bronowski 1977, 157-8).
One might also note some philosophical
problems raised by Bernard Lonergan (1992, 157, 290-1), who proposes
that Darwin unconsciously followed the philosophic presumption,
current in the nineteenth century, that science pertained only
to that which could be observed directly by the senses. In other
words, though he began the process of moving away from a naive
realist view of scientific knowledge, the fact that Darwin’s
attention could only focus on perceptible elements left a hole
in Darwin’s method and theory. From another perspective,
Lonergan finds Darwin wanting for not investigating the psyches
of animals, and for treating only the sensible elements, but
not the intelligible unities present in living things. One also
notes that Darwin’s theory of natural selection – the
backbone of The Origin of Species, was conceived on the basis
of Malthus’ social doctrine (Darwin 1958, 120). While the
Malthusian doctrine of lethal competition is an intelligible
and compelling explanation for the origin of species, a reading
of his work reveals that Darwin never allows for the possibility
that free market capitalism may not have been the natural order
in all places for the past 4,500 million years. It is no surprise,
as Flew notes (1984, 73), that Darwinism emerged from within
an English culture in which free-enterprise competition and the
subjugation of weaker competitors were seen as good and natural.
One observes that most often Darwin’s method has been accepted
most readily by those comfortable with free-market philosophy.
Alternatively, critics of Darwin’s method are often critics
of the free-market, exemplified by Gould who “learned his
Marxism literally at his daddy’s knee” and who puts
the point bluntly by saying “Darwin grafted Adam Smith upon
nature to establish his theory of natural selection” (Flew
1984, 73; Gould 1991, 100). We would not want to pretend that
Darwinists have not made any advances in the past 140 years.
Darwin’s methodological foundations persist, though, and
if Christian theologians are to appropriate Darwinism with honesty,
critical issues such as these would need addressing.
Conclusion
To conclude, Ruse’s work is highly recommended for those interested in Darwinian- Christian dialogue and he stands in stark contrast to some who consider it either good science or religion to deal only with highly selective readings of your opponents. While Ruse does explicate some dated theologies of original sin and sexuality, it is high achievement that he has shown an honest way for reductionist Darwinists to be able to accept Christianity – though he clarifies that this acceptance is possible, not prescribed. One could not divide science and religion without dealing honestly with Ruse’s work. On the other hand, if a Christian theologian wants to be a Darwinian, more work needs to be done. One can only commend this work to further research and the hope that if theologians approach the issue from the reverse side, but with Ruse’s skill, honesty and openness of mind, a question that has vexed Christianity since 1859 may be resolved positively.
References
Bronowski, Jacob. 1973. The Ascent of Man. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
________. 1977. A Sense of the Future: Essays in Natural Philosophy. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Darwin, Charles. 1958. The Autobiography of Charles Darwin. Edited by Nora Barlow. New York: W. W. Norton and Co.
Dobson, Ed, Ed Hindson and Jerry Falwell. 1986. The Fundamentalist Phenomenon. Second edition. Grand Rapids: Baker.
Flew, Antony. 1984. Darwinian Evolution. London: Paladin.
Gould, Stephen Jay. 1991 [1978]. Ever Since Darwin: Reflections in Natural History. London: Penguin.
Lewontin, Richard. 1991. Biology as Ideology. Toronto: Anansi.
Lonergan, Bernard.1992. Insight: A Study of Human Understanding. Ed. by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran. 5th ed., rev. and augmented. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Ruse, Michael. 1996. Monad to Man: The Concept of Progress in Evolutionary Biology. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
________. 1999. Mystery of Mysteries: Is Evolution a Social Construction? Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
________. 2001. Can a Darwinian be a Christian? The Relationship Between Science and Religion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Thornhill, Randy and Craig T. Palmer. 2000. A Natural History of Rape: Biological Bases of Sexual Coercion. Cambridge: MIT Press
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Dr Matthew C. Ogilvie teaches theology and religion at the Catholic Institute of Sydney and Australian Catholic University. He is soon taking up a postdoctoral research fellowship at the Lonergan Institute at Boston College.
